Thursday, August 14, 2003



New Zealand Psychologist, 1974, 3 (1), 21-26.

Also reprinted as Chapter 51 in: J.J. Ray (Ed.) "Conservatism as Heresy". Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co., 1974

HOW GOOD IS THE WILSON-PATTERSON CONSERVATISM SCALE?



JOHN J RAY

University of New South Wales

A review of findings with the Wilson and Patterson C-scale shows that, contrary to its authors' claims, it is not uniformly of high reliability, nor is it especially immune to acquiescent response set. The correlation between its nominally positive and negative halves has even been found on some occasions to be positive -- thus throwing the validity of the scale into question. It is pointed out that the short item format used in the C-scale is not original to Wilson and Patterson, and that a revised version of the scale is in existence which appears to overcome some of the defects mentioned above. It is concluded that the field of work opened up by the C-scale is of great intrinsic interest whether or not the C-scale has the psychometric advantages that were originally expected.


Since its publication in 1968, the Wilson and Patterson conservatism (C) scale appears already to have given rise to considerable interest and use. See for example Bagley (1970), Boshier (1969, 1972) and the references listed in Wilson and Nias (1972). It seems timely therefore to attempt a review of work done with this scale to see if it has in fact lived up to its great initial promise. The recent article by Wilson and Nias (1972) does attempt such a review but fails to report certain data leading to criticism of the scale.

The C-scale was presented as an innovation in the form of attitude measurement. Instead of full sentences it presented single words and phrases for the subject to respond to. From this format several advantages were expected: (1) It should be less susceptible to acquiescent set; (2) It should be more valid (by eliminating idiosyncratic "contextual" factors); (3) It should be less susceptible to social desirability contamination, it was also shown as a matter of empirical fact to be exceptionally reliable in the initial study.

Perhaps the first thing to note in evaluating these claims is that this format is not in fact original to Wilson and Patterson. Alpert and Sargent (1941) used something very similar for the measurement of conservatism, and for the measurement of other variables, the use of "adjective check-lists" is a well-known technique. See for example Mitchell (1961) -- where an adjective check list was shown to be exceptionally valid in the measurement of achievement motivation. The contribution of Wilson and Patterson, then, must be seen in the particular scale they present rather than in the format of that scale.

In their 1972 review, Wilson and Nias give by far the most space to acquiescence as the area where the C-scale is said to be superior. They say that their format attracts less acquiescence than the "old" format. They point to the great difficulties which the F and D scales have with acquiescent response set contamination and quote Cloud and Vaughan (1969) in support of their claims that the C-scale provides a better alternative for this reason. Cloud and Vaughan do in fact go to great lengths to demonstrate that the C-scale is little affected by acquiescence. However, as I have suggested elsewhere (Ray, 1972a), there is some failure here to distinguish between acquiescence as an artifactual and as an empirical correlate of the scale score. In truth, any balanced scale, no matter how poor, must control perfectly for artifactual contamination of the scale score with acquiescence. Where there are an equal number of positive and negative items which are summed to provide a total score, acquiescence should cause an increase in the scores on the positive items and a decrease in the scores on the reversed items. Since acquiescent response set is conceptualized as content-irrelevant, the effects should be equal for both sorts of items and the increases and decreases would hence cancel one another out. Thus not only the C-scale but also the balanced D and F scales by Haiman (1964), Ray (1970), Lee and Warr (1969) and Ray (1972b), provide perfectly satisfactory alternatives to the original F and D scales as far as eliminating the acquiescence problem is concerned. A somewhat different issue is the empirical correlation of some variable such as dogmatism truly measured, and acquiescence truly measured. In this respect there is some evidence that dogmatism is empirically related to acquiescence or "yeasaying" (Ray, 1970) but authoritarianism is not (Ray, 1971b). The only effect a correlation of this sort might reasonably be expected to have would be to cause us to calculate a yeasaying score as well as a content score for the balanced scale we are using and partial out the effect due to acquiescence.

Why then the fuss (exemplified by Wilson and Nias (1972) but not original to them) about the correlation between the positive and negative halves of balanced scales? As we have seen, the control against acquiescence provided by a balanced scale is in no way dependent on the magnitude of this statistic. The answer is that this correlation may reflect on the validity of our items if it is low. If one set of items is deliberately worded (as in balanced F scales) to mean the opposite of the other set, a failure to find a negative correlation reflects a failure of one or both of those item-sets to measure what it was intended to measure. It has twice been shown, however, that when normal psychometric precautions are observed, correlations of as high as -.71 can be obtained between item sets such as this (Ray, 1970, 1972b). The C-scale has thus no monopoly on high negative correlation between its two halves. Such results are also obtainable with conventional format balanced F and D scales.

What we must remember however is that the correlation between the two halves of a scale is an empirical matter that may truly reflect something about the world as well as about the operation of acquiescent set. Liberalism and Conservatism could (as Kerlinger (1967) believes) in fact be orthogonal. Measured orthogonality may reflect the nature of things as they are, not the presence of a measurement artifact due to acquiescence. How we assess what part of the correlation between the two halves of a balanced scale is due to acquiescence and what part is due to real opposition between the underlying attitudes is a rather difficult matter and one that is treated more fully elsewhere (Ray. 1973). For our present purposes however, it should be sufficient to look at the actual performance of the C-scale and some of its alternatives to enable us to assess the relative merits of the different scales as far as the correlation between the two halves is concerned. Even a relatively simplistic approach does serve where, as in the present case, the differences between the various scales are extreme.

Wilson and Nias (1972) rely heavily for their treatment of this issue on data from one of my own unpublished papers -- a paper partly based on my M.A. work at the University of Sydney (not as they state, Macquarie University) entitled "Are Liberalism and Conservatism orthogonal?" This paper was in fact the first version of a report later extensively recast and published as: "Are conservatism scales irreversible?" (Ray, 1972a). Sadly, Wilson and Nias seriously misunderstand and misrepresent the conclusions of the original paper. They report, quite correctly, my findings that a set of conventional items derived from the F, R, E and D scales, when divided up into positive and negative items, form two moderately reliable scales which correlate only .099. They also report that I found two scales in the new format measuring respectively "Liberalism" and "Conservatism" to correlate by contrast -.639. This also is true -- as far as it goes. What they fail to mention is that these two latter scales were not composed entirely of items worded in the one direction but were in fact both themselves balanced scales. The distinction between "Liberalism" and "Conservatism" scales was a conceptual one influenced by Kerlinger's (1967) proposals, not a distinction in terms of direction of wording. Putting it another way, the Conservatism scale was composed of pro-conservative and anti-conservative items and the Liberalism scale of pro-liberalism and anti-liberalism items. It was not assumed that an anticonservative item was pro-liberal or vice versa. This in fact was the fault of the paper, that made it unpublishable in its original form. The decision as to whether an item was pro-conservative or anti-liberal (for instance) was on some occasions a necessarily subjective one. Wilson and Nias can, then, claim no support from my paper for their contention that the C-scale shows characteristically higher correlations between positive and negative halves than do other scales in conventional format. In fact quite the opposite is the case. The published version of this paper (Ray, 1972a) shows that the C-scale has a positive correlation (of .288) between its two halves. My own revised version of the C-scale on the same sample showed a moderate negative correlation between the two halves. Wilson and Nias do not mention this finding at all.

How do we reconcile the above findings concerning the C-scale with those reported by Cloud and Vaughan (1969), who found a correlation between the two halves of -.68? At least part of the explanation may lie in variations in the gross amount of acquiescence (Yeasaying). Unlike Wilson or Cloud and Vaughan, I have found (see Ray, 1971a) that short format scales do elicit a large preponderance of "Yes" over "No" responses. Where the meaning-opposition between the supposedly negative and positive items is in fact slight, this acquiescence (which by definition has the effect of causing items to be responded to as if they were similar) may more than cancel out any tendency to respond to the items as if they were opposed. That the revised C-scale (Ray, 1972a) does not share the same problem of poor meaning-opposition between its two halves is attested to by the correlations between these two halves of -.373 and -.181 for the conscript and the student samples respectively (Ray, 1972b). It will be evident then that acquiescence can have a great effect on the validity of the C-scale published by Wilson and Patterson (19G8).

We must conclude then that Wilson's first three claims for his scale are far from universally supported. In three studies reported in two articles (Ray, 1971a, and 1972a) it has been found that the C-scale is of deficient reliability (Ray, 1971a) when applied to general population samples and it is strongly affected by acquiescent response set to the point of making the scale seriously invalid (Ray, 1972a). His more recently made claim that the scale is little affected by social desirability set has been challenged by Schneider (1973). The above criticism of the C-scale's reliability must be qualified somewhat, however. Bagley, Wilson and Boshier (1970) used a community sample and found a reliability of .89, which is substantial. Regrettably, however, door-to-door samples are not necessarily representative either. The "volunteer artifact" can be extremely large and one cannot assume that the attitudes of co-operative people are organized in the same way as the attitudes of the non co-operative. Conscript samples are not biased in this way (filling out questionnaires is a welcome alternative to the parade ground) and may hence be far more representative (within the limits of age and sex) than almost any other sample. Indeed, if we assume that filling out questionnaires is a task more intelligible and congenial to more educated people, the "Volunteer" bias of a door-to-door sample could also be an educational bias. The Bagley, Wilson and Boshier (1970) results might then not be seriously in conflict with the generalization made earlier that C-scale reliabilities are satisfactory only when the scale is applied to educated samples.

Another issue which has arisen recently is Boshier's (1972) demonstration that the C-scale items can factorially be segregated into no less than four orthogonal sub-scales and that these sub-scales are identifiable in terms of reasonably traditional content areas. This finding however, will be deterring only to tyros who fancy that factor analysis tells one what the structure of an item set is. Although factor analysis can be useful in suggesting hypotheses, it has long been abandoned as a means of testing hypotheses about structure (witness the British-American dispute about the structure of intelligence). Obviously, the unifactor structure found in the items by Wilson (1970) is equally as "correct" as the structure found by Boshier (1972). With different factor analytical methods many structures are possible. Only usefulness determines which one we prefer.

In conclusion, then, it is not true that the correlation between positive and negative halves is greatly superior or even at all superior in the C-scale as compared to conventional balanced scales in the same content area. It is also not true that the C-scale is exceptionally reliable or that it is uniformly resistant to acquiescent set. The interest of the C-scale then must remain intrinsic. It is interesting because of its inherent directness. Although this directness may not lead to the psychometric advantages claimed by Wilson and Nias (1972) it does open up a field worth investigating in its own right. The hypotheses of Kerlinger (1967) are one instance where the C-scale makes possible a more exact test of something asserted about social attitudes (see Kerlinger, 1972; Ray, 1972a).

Another final observation that might have some usefulness is that those who wish to use the new item format might find the revised C-scale (Ray, 1972a) superior to the original. The revised scale does at least initially appear to overcome three of the problems with the original: low general population reliability; occasional positive correlations between the supposedly negative and positive halves; and the regular alternation between negative and positive items which makes it possible that some respondents will "guess the pattern" and thus give spuriously consistent answers.


REFERENCES

Alpert, R. and Sargent, S. S. Conservatism-radicalism measured by immediate emotional reactions. Journal of Social Psychology, 1941, 14, 181-186.

Bagley, C. Racial prejudice and the conservative personality: A British sample. Political Studies, 1970, 18, 134-141.

Bagley, C., Wilson, G. D., and Boshier, R. W. The Conservatism scale: a factor structure comparison of English, Dutch and New Zealand samples. Journal of Social Psychology, 1970, 77, 739-740.

Boshier. R. W. A study of the relationship between self-concept and conservatism. Journal of Social Psychology, 1969, 77, 139-140.

Boshier, R. W. To rotate or not to rotate: The question of the conservatism scale. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1972. 11, 313-323.

Cloud, J, and Vaughan, G. M. Using balanced scales to control acquiescence. Sociometry, 1969, 33. 193-202.

Haiman, F. S. A revised scale for the measurement of open mindedness. Speech Monographs, 1964, 31, 97-102.

Kerlinger, F. N. Social attitudes and their criterial referents: A structural theory. Psychological Review, 1967, 74, 110-122.

Kerlinger, F. N. The structure and content of social attitude referents: A preliminary study. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1972, 32, 613-630.

Lee, R. E. and Warr, P. B. The development and standardization of a balanced `F' scale. Journal of General Psychology, 1969, 81, 109-129.

Mitchell, J. V. An analysis of the factorial dimensions of the achievement motivation construct. Journal of Educational Psychology, 1961, 52, 179-187.

Ray, J.J. (1970) The development and validation of a balanced Dogmatism scale. Australian Journal of Psychology, 22, 253-260.

Ray, J.J. (1971a) "A new measure of conservatism" -- Its limitations. British Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 10, 79-80.

Ray, J.J. (1971b) An "Attitude to Authority" scale. Australian Psychologist, 6, 31-50.

Ray, J.J. (1972a) Are conservatism scales irreversible? British J. Social & Clinical Psychology 11, 346-352.

Ray, J.J. (1972b) A new balanced F scale -- And its relation to social class. Australian Psychologist 7, 155-166.

Ray, J. J. Acquiescence and the correlation between positive and negative halves of balanced scales. Unpublished paper available from author, 1973.

Schneider, J. F. The conservatism scale: Independent of SD? British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1973, 12, 90-91.

Wilson, G. D. Is there a general factor in social attitudes? Evidence from a factor analysis of the conservatism scale. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 1970, 9, 101-107.

Wilson, G. D. and Nias, D. K. B. Measurement of social attitudes: A new approach. Perceptual and Motor Skills 1972, 35, 827-834.

Wilson, G. D. and Patterson, J. R. A new measure of conservatism. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 1968, 7, 264-269.


POST-PUBLICATION ADDENDA

1). Wilson's reply to this article simply pointed out that the C-scale does not usually have the problems I report in the article above. That is perfectly true. I have confirmed as much myself. See the reference hereunder. The C-scale is therefore suitable for continued use as long as checks are made to see that each particular use of it is not one of the "aberrant" cases. Sadly, such a check seems to be done very rarely.

Ray, J.J. (1980) Acquiescence and the Wilson Conservatism scale. Personality & Individual Differences, 1, 303-305.


2). My 1973 unpublished paper cited above is no longer available in its original form. A revised and expanded version is however available as under:

Ray, J.J. (Unpublished) Acquiescent response tendency: An update and some data on the invalidity of the Dogmatism scale



Monday, July 14, 2003



Chapter 52 from: J.J. Ray (Ed.) Conservatism as Heresy". Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co., 1974

(With four post-publication addenda following the original article)

WHO ARE THE ALIENATED?



John Ray

A collection of all the items that could be found in the literature which were claimed to measure alienation or anomie was made. These were ordered under six conceptual headings (normlessness, powerlessness, cynicism, isolation, meaninglessness and dissatisfaction) and were shown to form reliable scales, all of which intercorrelated significantly. Treated as a single scale, the total 168 items showed a reliability of .93 on a general population sample. By selecting items which correlated most highly with the total scale, a 'core' of twenty items was chosen to form a scale with the definitive construct validity of the 168 items but short enough to be conveniently administered. This 'GA' scale showed a reliability of .86 and was completely balanced against acquiescent set. Using the new scale, alienation was found to correlate significantly with politically radical ideology and preference for radical political parties. It was found not to correlate with F scale authoritarianism but significantly negatively with attitude to authority. It was also found to be strongly related to job-dissatisfaction but was not related to social class.


ONE OF THE recurrent themes in much radical literature is that of alienation. We are told that alienation is the characteristic state of practically everybody -- from the 'workers' to 'housewives'. This supposed malaise is the foundation for much radical critique of modern society. If so many people are alienated, society obviously needs big changes if it is to be at all humanly satisfactory.

In the present paper, what will be attempted is an empirical examination of just what alienation is and who suffers from it. As will be seen, the need for a new study in this area is taken to spring from the poor standard of methodological rigour in previous work. The present study is then an attempt to approach more closely to the goal of definitiveness than has previously been done.

The first step, of course is to examine the measuring instruments that have heretofore been used in the field. Can we measure alienation adequately? Unless we can answer this question with some assurance, any attempt to study the distribution (if you like, the epidemiology ) of alienation will be foredoomed. As will be seen, the present study does seem to require as its first step some improvement on existing alienation scales.

'What? Another alienation scale?', one might say at this point. As the incomplete bibliography of this paper will graphically show, there have already been published far more scales claiming to measure alienation, anomie or related variables than would seem necessary. The present author already has two to his partial credit (Ray & Sutton, 1972). This situation is most unlike some other fields of social-psychological enquiry where one instrument is accepted as the measure of the construct concerned -- With authoritarianism, for instance, the California F scale has reigned supreme (Adorno et al, 1950) either in its original form or in versions altered only to take account of the acquiescent response set problem (e.g. Berkowitz & Wolkon, 1964; Lee & Warr, 1969; Ray 1972g ). Given the different emphases favoured by different authors in defining the construct, it seems that there is no real hope that such unanimity will reign with respect to the favoured measure of alienation. If greater unanimity could be attained, however, there would be very clear benefits in the more frequent comparability of one set of research findings with another. The scale presented in this paper, then, is one specifically designed to have wide appeal as an authoritative measure of the construct. To the extent to which it is accepted it may help to reduce the confusion in this field. In their study, Bonjean, Hill & McLemore (1965) found no less than twenty-four scales and indices used in just one five year period to measure alienation or anomie.

At this point to give a preliminary conceptual definition of the construct does not necessarily seem appropriate. As will be seen, the entire work following constitutes an 'empirical' definition of it. Suffice it to say that we are here concerned with what might be called the political scientist's favourite construct. The concept of the 'alienated workers' dates back to Karl Marx (Marcuse, 1941) and the related term 'anomie' was extensively used by Durkheim (1951). Its potential relevance as a differentiator of class attitudes is therefore quite clear. The hypothesis is that because of their relative powerlessness and relative lack of rewards the workers are more alienated from society than the upper classes. See Dean (1961), Josephson (1962) and Merton (1946) for modern discussions of this view.

A question that is a logical preliminary in any new study of this construct is whether the many variants and proposed scales of alienation do in fact empirically hang together. Is there in fact such a thing as alienation or is it simply a general rubric for a number of empirically unrelated variables?

Studies along lines such as this have been done before -- notably those by Dean (1961) and Olsen (1969). Study 'I' below extends this work. It goes beyond Dean (1961) in that it considers a more extensive range of constructs (six versus three) and it also goes beyond that of Olsen (1969) in considering many more items (168 versus eight).

STUDY I

An extensive search was made of the published literature for scales and items said to measure alienation or anomie. A total of 168 were collected. Unfortunately the collection was not nearly balanced. There turned out to be a great preponderance of positive items. Where possible, therefore, the wording of an item was changed so as to reverse its meaning.

The collected items were then carefully divided up under the six construct headings given by Olsen (1969) and the six item pools were thenceforth treated as six sub-scales. The entire item pool, ungrouped, was then given as a questionnaire to ninety-eight second year students in a social psychology course at Macquarie University. The major works referred to -- both as sources of items and for clarification of the sub-categories were: Srole (1956), Seeman (1959), Dean (1961), Rosenberg (1956), Fromm (1955), Simmons (1966), Nettler (1957), C. Wright Mills (1951), Merton (1957), Clark (1959), Neal & Rettig (1967), Struening & Richardson (1965), McDiII (1961), Meier & Bell (1959), Olsen (1965); Mizruchi (1960), Kornhauser (1959), Bell (1957), Roberts & Rokeach (1956) and McClosky & Schaar (1965).

The intercorrelation matrix as actually observed of the six subscales is given in Table 1. The reliabilities for the unmodified subscales were: Normlessness .62; Powerlessness .74; Meaninglessness .66; Isolation .73; Dissatisfaction .84; Disillusionment .79.

TABLE 1

Intercorrelations among six categories of alienation: 1 = Normlessness or Guidelessness, 2 = Powerlessness, 3 = Meaninglessness, 4 = Dissimilarity or Isolation, 5 = Dissatisfaction, 6 = Disillusionment or Cynicism. All correlations are significant.

............1..........2...........3........4..............5...........6

1......1.000...0.373....0.417....0.396.....0.445.....0.619
2.................1.000....0.597....0.365.....0.228......0.474
3..............................1.000....0.470.....0.385......0.478
4...........................................1.000.....0.510......0.611
5.........................................................1.000......0.575
6........................................................................1.000

Since all correlations between all subscales were significant, we have most unambiguous proof that all six scales belong together. If any further evidence for the unidimensionality of the alienation items were needed, it is provided by the alpha for the entire battery treated as one scale. This was .92. It does not seem immediately obvious on empirical grounds that a sense of powerlessness and normlessness should go together. One can easily imagine a very powerful but normless person -- a sort of amoral giant but empirically it does seem that there is in fact an interdependence between all of the six constructs which can be expressed as one category of alienation. The intercorrelations are of course low enough still to leave quite open the possibility of such amoral giants. In fact it cannot be asserted too strongly that a high correlation between the subscales does not indicate identity of the constructs. It is therefore of very great importance that an alienation scale should -- to be truly adequate -- reflect the influence of each of the sub-categories treated here. It does not appear that such a scale of 'general alienation' exists at the moment. For such a scale to be most widely useful it would also have to be completed balanced against acquiescent set (Carr, 1971) and standardised for a general population sample.

STUDY II

In this study an attempt is made to provide the scale, called for in the last paragraph above -- a balanced scale to reflect what is general in all the several sub-categories of alienation. The existence of the 168 item scale puts us in an excellent and perhaps unique position to carry this out. Obviously it itself could be used as such a scale once it was shown to be as reliable on a general population sample as it was on the student sample. Reasons against this however are its length and its considerable preponderance of positive items. Nonetheless, reflecting as it does the summed thought and conceptual effort of so many previous alienation scale writers, scores on it provide an excellent criterion for correlation with a new scale.

The 168 item scale was administered to a mixed sample of 138 persons. This sample was a mixed one used solely for the purpose of scale-construction -- where heterogeneity rather than representativeness is important. It was composed of two groups, (1) thirty-eight school teachers at a Macquarie University vacation school; (2) one hundred process workers from a local factory.

The one hundred process workers were all employed in three factories of Plessey Pacific Pty Ltd. The great majority were female and all were engaged in stages of the manufacture of telecommunications equipment. In the first group -- of thirty-eight school teachers -- thirty-six were males. This group consisted of those present at a vacation school for first year external students at Macquarie University. As external students, almost all these were of mature years and as teachers they tend originally to come from rather lower socio-economic status homes than most university students. Nonetheless there is considerable contrast between the two samples and it was hoped that this contrast would give some representation to the real contrast between respondents that exists in the community at large. It must be stressed again however that there is no claim for representativeness. For the purpose of constructing scales representativeness is not essential as long as a reasonable degree of heterogeneity is maintained.

Results

A single scale was made up to comprise all of the 168 items collected. It showed an initial reliability of .93. It was reduced by the ITRO item-analysis procedure (see Ray, 1972b) to a twenty item balanced scale with a reliability of .86. In this procedure each item is correlated with the total scale score and a small group of the most weakly correlating items deleted. A new total score is then calculated for the reduced scale and all remaining items correlated with the new total. Then the next weakest group of items is deleted and the whole process repeated until some criterion is satisfied. Normally, this criterion is the maximisation of the 'alpha' (Cronbach, 1951) reliability statistic. In the present case the criterion was a partly subjective one -- to obtain a scale short enough to be widely usable without sacrificing too much reliability. It will be evident that the general effect of this procedure is to select that core of items which most nearly measures what the total scale as a whole measures. It is an empirical method of 'zeroing in' on what is basic to the total item set-of finding the 'quintessence' of that item set. A variation on the usual ITRO procedure was that it was required that no negative items be dropped until the proportion of positive to negative items was equal -- and after that point positive and negative items could only be dropped in pairs. Without this precaution, program ITRO would have dropped all the negative items in its progress to the twenty item length. The result of the extra stipulation was that the ten negative items finally chosen had a lower mean correlation with the final total score than did the ten positive items. The final scale is given in the Appendix. The correlation between positive and negative halves of the scale was --.758. As mentioned above, it was assured by the analytical procedure that the twenty items finally chosen best represented what was general to the original 168 item pool. Since this pool represented the summed thought and conceptual effort of so many previous writers, it can reasonably be said that the new scale is of pre-eminent construct validity. In the following sections, the question of predictive validity will be taken up.

STUDY III

Two of the major foci of interest with alienation are its relation to the political process and its relation to work and the workplace in a modern industrial society. In Study III it is the first of these that we will primarily be examining. In Study IV we will move on to the latter.

The obvious hypothesis in the political field is that alienation will be one source of political radicalism. After all, if people are dissatisfied with some situation it is reasonable to expect that they might want to change it. They may resent feeling powerless and endeavour to attain power -- by revolutionary means if necessary. A correlation with politically radical attitudes and voting for radical political parties would then represent validation for the new scale of primary importance.

Against this however, there is considerable temptation to associate the concept of alienation with the concept of authoritarianism. Although findings on the correlation between alienation and authoritarianism vary, there is a certain reasonableness in thinking that persons who assent to: 'Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places' (F scale) should also assent to: 'It is difficult for people like myself to have much influence in public affairs' (GA scale). But, authoritarianism has always been associated with political conservatism, whereas alienation is generally associated with political radicalism. There are reasons therefore to support two opposing hypotheses: (1) That the GA scale will correlate negatively with authoritarianism (because of the opposing ideological associations); and (2) that it will correlate positively with authoritarianism (because of a shared 'jaundiced' view of the world). Obviously, it is only empirical evidence which can enable us to decide which is true.

The GA scale is one particularly suitable for sorting this question out not only because of its great construct validity but also because it is balanced against acquiescence. All the correlates of the California F scale have in the past fallen under suspicion because of possible acquiescence contamination (Brown, 1965) and the correlation with alienation is surely no exception. Given that a successful balanced F scale is also now available (Ray, 1972g) we are, for probably the first time, in a position to examine the correlation of the two attributes with acquiescence artifact completely controlled. It is at least possible that the previous correlations such as that of +.45 between the 'A' and 'F' scales reported by Srole (1956) will be found to be entirely explained by a shared acquiescence artifact (Carr, 1971).

The use of a balanced scale here also provides the opportunity to make an artifact-free investigation of the classical Marxian prediction. The workers may or may not have been more alienated in Marx's day. We cannot know for certain. What we can find out here however is whether they are characteristically more alienated today. The results of this enquiry will also provide a lead-in to Study IV.

Method

A questionnaire was made up to include measures of all the constructs treated previously. Conservatism was represented by the four content-area scales given in Ray (1971) rather than by a 'general' measure. The full range of data available may be summarised as: Age, Sex, Occupation, Subjective class, Education, Father's Education, Political Party Preference, Political Conservatism, Social Conservatism, Economic Conservatism, Moral Conservatism, Attitude to Authority, Authoritarianism (BF) and Alienation. It will be noted that two separate scales were used to ensure adequate coverage in the measurement of authoritarianism. In addition to the balanced F (BF) scale there was the 'attitude to authority' (Ray, 1971c ) scale.

The sample used in this study was the same as that used for Study II, Chapter 43, part two of this book.

Results

Correlations observed between the balanced Alienation scale and other variables were: Age -.234, sex .075, Occupation -.132, Subjective class -.086, Education -.055, political preference -.266, Political conservatism -.265, Social conservatism -.071, Economic conservatism -.285, Moral conservatism -.154, AA scale -.434, BF scale -.020.

We must conclude that if alienation was related to social class in Marx's day it certainly is not now. There was no significant correlation with occupation, education or subjective class. It is, however, related to political radicalism -- which is of course the expected finding. The division into two classes of the non-manual workers produced no significant differences in alienation. Mean scores (and SDs ) for the two groups were: Professionals -- 56.48 (9.90), Business-people -- 56.80 (9.95). What is of great interest here however is the difference in the correlations with the AA and BF scales. Alienation is highly related to AA scale scores (negatively) but not at all to BF scale scores. Thus we have yet another instance where reliance on the F scale for our measure of authoritarianism would be misleading. As was perhaps foreshadowed earlier, the obvious explanation for this is that alienation and authoritarianism are in fact thoroughly opposed sentiments but the Alienation items and the BF scale items share a common inbuilt paranoid component which works to make scores on the two positively related. The outcome of the two opposing tendencies of real opposition of implications and common paranoid wording component is an overall orthogonality.

We may conclude then that alienation is a type of pathological radicalism not peculiar to any social class. For justification of the 'pathological' adjective see Ray & Sutton (1972). In that article a correlation between the Eysenck neuroticism scale and an earlier version of the present alienation scale of .40 was shown.

Previous findings of a positive relationship between alienation and authoritarianism (Srole, 1956) must then indeed have been due to a common acquiescence component. The present study is the first to use balanced scales in the measurement of both variables. It should be clear that approving of the authority institutions and practices of one's community is analytically opposed to being alienated from one's community and disapproving of its institutions and practices. That this is empirically so the present negative correlation between the AA and balanced Alienation scales attests.

The central point of this study however is that the significant correlations with politically radical attitudes and preference for radical political parties has demonstrated predictive validity for the GA scale.

STUDY IV*

Even if the Marxian view of alienation as the state of the industrial worker is untrue for our times, there does remain a lively possibility that where alienation does exist, it is a prime source of labour discontent. The preceding data do allow of the interpretation that alienation may have simply become universal in recent years. The industrial worker is no longer alone in being alienated. Given that automation and computers tend to increase the diversity and responsibility of tasks both in the factory and in the office, this does seem on the face of it an unlikely trend --particularly when we note the steady and undisputable shortening of the working week over the last century. Because we cannot go back in time and give our scale to the workers of Marx's day, there is no certain answer to this question but we can at least examine the function of alienation (whatever its levels) using present day data. How much of labour discontent today does it account for? To help provide at least a preliminary answer to this question the present study was carried out. In this study the new scale was administered as part of a class project by second-year undergraduate students to a group of 122 clerical, administrative and manual workers at the University of New South Wales. No guarantees of representativeness can of course be made for this sample but an effort was made to achieve as much heterogeneity as possible. As we are concerned with the possibilities of a relationship rather than with the absolute levels of a variable this may not be a great limitation for an exploratory study.

As well as the GA scale, a set of ten single items were included in the questionnaire to get at various aspects of job-satisfaction. These items and their correlation with the GA scale are given in Table 2. It will be seen that nine of these items are in fact significantly related to alienation (p <.05-single tailed -- where r >.155) and that several items are in fact, by the usual standards of relationship found in work such as this, quite high, e.g. items 4, 5, 7, 10. Alienation from society and alienation from the job do go together.

These results are of course yet more clear validation for the scale and they do support the idea of alienation as a set of attitudes having at least part of their source in a pervasive personal neuroticism (See also Ray & Sutton, 1972). No interpretation of the present data, however, can be made to suggest that alienation is the sole or even the major source of labour discontent. Even a correlation of .35 explains only fourteen and a half per cent of the variance. Factors such as pay, the task itself and attitudes of the boss and workmates must still bear a large burden of the explanation.

TABLE 2

Correlations of GA scale and job-satisfaction items

..................Item..............................................................................Correlation

1. The only rewards a person can get from my job are financial. .189
2. Does your job allow you to use your own initiative? -.262
3. Do you feel your fellow workers appreciate your value at work? -.245
4. Is your job repetitive? .382
5. Is your job boring? .352
6. Do you enjoy being in the company of your fellow workers? -.150
7. Do you daydream at work? .322
8. How often are your fellow-workers willing to give you whatever advice or assistance they are able to give, to help with your job, if you ask for it? -.267
9. In cases of disagreements about work with your superior, how often can you get your own way? -.188
10. How often do you feel like a small cog in a large machine, here at work? .365

CONCLUSION

A quintessential measure of what previous writers have seen fit to call alienation or anomie has been produced and shown to have predictive validity in both the political and labour relations fields. This work has also served to demonstrate that there is indeed such a thing as alienation underlying the many constructs associated with the term and that it is -- contrary to previous findings -- opposed to authoritarianism and not class-polarised. One must thus conclude that although many radical intellectuals themselves may be forever doomed to alienation, their attempt to 'project' their own feelings on to broad sections of the rest of society just will not stand up.

If one set one's standards low enough (or high enough, depending on one's point of view) there must always be a sense in which one can say that everyone is alienated. The only meaningful question that one can examine, therefore, is whether people are more alienated at one time than another or more alienated if they are members of one group than if they are members of another group. We cannot examine easily the historical ('diachronic') question; but to the 'synchronic' question we have some grounds for saying that differences do exist. But the Marxian view that modern industrial society produces alienation among the 'broad toiling masses' of the working class is not supported.

---------------------

* I am indebted to Mr. J. Rawson for making available the data on which this study was based.

--------------------

Full citation details for all references used above are available here

APPENDIX

The items of the General Alienation (GA) scale. Alpha = .86. Reversed items are marked 'R'.

1 Beneath the polite and smiling surface of man's nature is a bottomless pit of evil.
2 These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on.
3 Human nature is fundamentally co-operative. R
4 Most people can be trusted. R
5 We are the hollow men; we are the stuffed men; leaning together -- headpiece filled with straw.
6 I can normally do what I want to do in today's set-up. R
7 The decisions of our courts of justice are as fair to a poor man as to a
wealthy man. R
8 Considering everything that is going on these days, things look bright
for the younger generation. R
9 Delinquency is not as serious a problem as the papers play it up to be. R
10 For the most part, the government serves the interests of a few organised groups, such as business or labour, and isn't very concerned about the needs of people like myself.
11 In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse.
12 Most public officials are not really interested in the problems of the average man.
13 People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
14 It is difficult for people like myself to have much influence in public affairs.
15 Life today is a difficult and dangerous business and it's a matter of chance who gets on top.
16 No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
17 Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job. R
18 In this society, most people can find contentment. R
19 Our community is an easy and pleasant place to live in. R
20 We seem to live in a pretty rational and well ordered world. R

POST-PUBLICATION ADDENDA

1). In my "Conclusion" section above I summarized one of my findings as showing that alienation was "opposed to authoritarianism". That is correct in academic language but the meaning of the finding in plainer language was that alienated people tended to be anti-authority. And the correlation concerned (-.434) was relatively high -- as one would expect.

2). The response options for each item of the GA scale were: Strongly Agree, Agree, Not Sure, Disagree, Strongly Agree. For items marked 'R', these responses were scored 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. For items not so marked, the same responses were scored 5, 4, 3. 2 and 1 respectively. The scale score is the sum of the item scores.

3). The original items of the alienation battery classified into six hypothetical dimensions.

1. Guidelessness or Normlessness

"Pro" items

1. Some political corruption is a necessary evil of government.
2. Having "pull" is more important than ability in getting a government job.
3. In order to get elected to government, a candidate must make promises he does not intend to keep.
4. In getting a job promotion, some degree of "apple polishing" is required.
5. Those elected to the government have to serve special interests (e.g. big business or trade unions) as well as the public's interest.
6. In order to have a good income, a salesman must use high-pressure salesmanship.
7. The end often justifies the means.
8. Those running our government have to hush up many things
that go on behind the scenes, if they wish to stay in office.
9. Things are changing so fast these days that one doesn't know what to expect from day to day.
10. Of the many ways that people could live their lives one is just about as good as another.
11. There are so many ideas about what is right and wrong these days that it is hard to figure out how to live your own life.
12. People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.
13. I often feel that many things our parents stood for are just going to ruin before our very eyes.
14. Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow.
15. It seems to me that other people find it earlier to decide what is right than I do.
16. The trouble with the world today is that most people really don't believe in anything.
17. With everything in such a state of disorder, it's hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next.


"Anti" items

1. A man should obey the laws, no matter how much they interfere with his personal ambitions.
2. It has to a large extent been proved that the honest life is the best life.
3. The individual these days has a good chance of finding a sensible moral standard to live by.
4. The religious organizations in our country have a lot of influence in making our society a better place to live.
5. A person must be of high moral character if he wishes to be successful in politics.
6. In getting a good paying job, its unwise to exaggerate one`s abilities (or personal merits).
7. Success in business and politics can easily be achieved without taking advantage of gullible people.

2. Powerlessness

"Pro" items

1. We are just so many cogs in the machinery of life.
2. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
3. I sometimes feel my life is being pushed in directions where I don't want to go.
4. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
5. I often feel I am only a cog in a big machine.
6. In my work, I feel exploited by other people.
7. One can't hope to become the sort of person one would like to.
8. Life today is a difficult and dangerous business, and it's a matter of chance who gets on top.
9. A few people at the top control most political parties.
10. It is difficult for people like myself to have much influence in public affairs.
11. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
12. There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence actions of the government.
13. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.
14. There is little or nothing I can do to prevent another world war.
15. There's little use in me voting, since one vote doesn't count very much anyway.
16. Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
17. More and more, I feel helpless in the face of what's happening in the world today.
18. Whether one likes it or not, chance plays an awfully large part in world events.
19. It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really influence what happens in society at large.
20. There's very little that persons like myself can do to improve the world opinion of Australia.
21. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little man can do about it.
22. There's very little we can do to keep prices from going higher.
21. With everything so uncertain these days it almost seems as though anything could happen.


"Anti" items

1. With enough effort, we can wipe out political corruption.
2. I think I could just as easily live in other societies - past or present - as in this one.
3. One man and the right idea can change the world.
4. I think each of us can do a great deal to improve world opinion of Australia.
5. I think we have adequate means for preventing runaway price rises.
6. In our society, if you work hard you can usually get ahead.
7. I can normally do what I want to do in to-day's set-up.
8. It is quite possible to plan one's life ahead with confidence.
9. Those who do not vote are largely responsible for bad government.
10. I sometimes feel personally to blame for the sad state of affairs in our government.
11. Active discussion of politics can eventually lead to a better world.
12. By studying the world situation, one can greatly increase his political effectiveness.
13. The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions.
14. One can always find friends if he shows himself friendly.
15. People like me can change the course of world events if we make ourselves heard.

3. Meaninglessness

"Pro" items

1. I often wonder why we have cyclones and other disasters.
2. I often think it is impossible to know what will happen next in the world about us.
3. It is hard to know how to interpret what people say to you nowadays.
4. It's a source of amazement to me that our society can function at all when you think of how complex it all is.
5. We are the hollow men; We are the stuffed men, leaning together - headpiece filled with straw.
6. Life, as most men live it, is meaningless.
7. Many people are unhappy because they do not know what they want out of life.
8. There are many people who don't know what to do with their lives.
9. I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.
10. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can't really understand what's going on.
11. Life seems to be rather meaningless.
12. The international situation is so complex that it just confuses a person to think about it.

"Anti" items

1. It's quite clear why some people must always be poor while others are rich.
2. People generally seem to know what the outcome of their actions will be.
3. We seem to live in a pretty rational and well ordered world.
4. Human life is an expression of divine purpose.
5. On the whole, life makes good sense to me.
6. Life has a clear purpose.
7. We all have a chance to play a part and do our duty in some great design the end of which no mortal eye can foresee.

4. Dissimilarity or Isolation

"Pro" items

1. What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime.
2. There is a great lack of understanding between the older and younger generation.
3. There are several people I regard as my enemies.
4. National sports such as football and cricket do not interest me.
5. Other than outright enemies, I feel I have several acquaintances who would be pleased, secretly or openly, at any misfortune that might befall me.
6. Many people in our society are lonely and unrelated to their fellow human beings.
7. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
8. It is almost impossible for one person to really understand the feelings of another.
9. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
10. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
11. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.
12. I often feel awkward and out of place,
13. Sometimes I feel all alone in the world
14. Most people lead lives of quiet desperation.
15. The younger generation is very little understood by their elders.
16. I try to avoid being alone.
17. I join social groups.
18. I try to participate in group activities


"Anti" items


1. It is easy to get along with people.
2. I like the latest model Holden.
3. I like to participate in church activities.
4. I seldom feel lonely.
5. People usually accept and welcome you just as you really are.
6. I really feel at home with the people I mix with
7. You can usually be sure who you can count on.
8. Most people are willing to help someone in need
9. When people are doing things together I tend to join them.
10. I try to include other people in my plans.
11. I try to have people around me
12. I tend to join social organizations when I have an opportunity.
13. I vote in national elections.
14. I enjoy T.V.
15. I read the Readers Digest.
16. I am interested in the outcome of Federal elections.
17. In spite of the fast pace of modern living it is easy to have many close friends that you can really count on.

5. Dissatisfaction

"Pro" items

1. Most public officials are not really interested in the problems of the average man.
2. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse.
3. Educated people should have more influence on this country's affairs than they do.
4. There are too many repressive forces in Australian society.
5. With the present generation of leaders the future of Australia is not very bright.
6. Politicians have far too little regard for the views of the people who elect them.
7. The Australian culture is conformist and restricting.
8. With life in Australia as it is today it is surprising that protests and demonstrations are not more widespread.
9. As the government is now organized and operated, I think it is hopelessly incapable of dealing with all the crucial problems facing the country today,
10. It seems to me that the government often fails to take necessary actions on important matters, even when most people favour such actions.
11. For the most part, the government serves the interests of a few organized groups, such as business or labour, and isn't very concerned about the needs of people like myself.
12. These days the government is trying to do too many things, including some activities that I don't think it has a right to do.
13. There's little use in writing to public officials because often they aren't really interested in the problems of the average man.
14. Australia needs firm, strong government.
15. Most politicians and city councillors are only in politics for what they can get out of it, and are not much good

"Anti" items

1. Our community is an easy and pleasant place to live in,
2. In this society, most people can find contentment.
3. Most members of parliament and city councillors are sympathetic people and do a good job.
4. It's easy to find a job worth doing.
5. People usually appreciate it when you do good work.
6. Mostly, people are fair in their dealings with me.
7. Many progressive social ideas have been introduced in Australia in recent years.
8. Delinquency is not as serious a problem as the papers play it up to be.
9. Considering everything that is going on these days, things look bright for the younger generation.
10. On the whole, our economic system is just and wise.
11. The decisions of our courts of justice are as fair to a poor man as to a wealthy man.

6. Disillusionment or cynicism

"Pro" items

1. I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think.
2. The general public is not qualified to vote on today's complex issues.
3. In getting ahead in life, it is not what you know that counts, it's who you know.
4. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
5. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world the way things look for the future,
6. Religion is mostly myth.
7. For myself, (or assuming I could have my life again), I think a single life would be more satisfactory.
8. People will do almost anything if the reward is high enough.
9. It is usually best to tell your supervisors or bosses what they really want to hear.
10. For a strike to be effective, picket line violence is necessary.
11. These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on.
12. Most people don't really care what happens to the next fellow.
13. I think children are generally a nuisance to their parents.
14. I am not interested in having children (or: I would not be even if of the right age)
15. Most married people lead trapped and frustrated lives.
16. Few people really look forward to their work.
17. It is all right for a person to break the law if he doesn't get caught.
18. So many people do things well that it is easy to become discouraged,
19. A man who never gets angry at anything or anyone is not likely to be treated with respect.
20. Beneath the polite and smiling surface of man's nature is a bottomless pit of evil.
21. There are times when it is absolutely necessary to use other people as tools in the accomplishment of a purpose.
22. The real substance of life consists of a process of disillusionments, with but few goals that are worth the effort spent in reaching them.

"Anti" items

1. The great majority of citizens in a democracy are sufficiently rational and informed to make sound political decisions.
2. Most people who complain of bad luck don't realize how much they are the cause of it.
3. Everyone should have someone in his life whose happiness means as much to him as his own.
4. Parents are usually willing to give up most of their personal pleasures to provide for their family.
5. The successful people in our society are usually the most honest.
6. Government officials will generally work pretty hard to help a person out as long as he lets them know what his problems are.
7. Most people can be trusted.
8. Human nature is fundamentally co-operative.
9. People will be honest with you as long as you are honest with them.
10. Every person should believe so strongly in some cause that he is willing to risk his life for it.
11. I feel that we have adequate ways of coping with political pressure groups.
12. There are days when one awakes from sleep without a care in the world, full of zest and eagerness for whatever lies ahead of him.
13. In this society, the better people mostly get to the top.
14. Most people are quite trustworthy.
15. In this society, people's respect for your character will get you a long way.
16. For most people, it is more important to make friends than to make money.

4). Other papers on alienation that may be of interest are as under:

Ray, J.J. (1982) Towards a definitive alienation scale. J. Psychology, 112, 67-70.

Ray, J.J. (1984) Alienation, dogmatism and acquiescence. J. Clinical Psychology 40, 1007-1008.

Ray, J.J. (1987) Radicalism and alienation. Journal of Social Psychology 127, 219-220.



Saturday, June 14, 2003



Chapter 53 from: J.J. Ray (Ed.) "Conservatism as Heresy". Sydney: A.N.Z. Book Co., 1974

MORALISM AND POLITICS



By John Ray

It is shown that Left-wing activism is often termed 'moralistic' by its opponents. It is suggested that any idea that moral statements could have truth value is delusory and a moralist is defined as one who accepts such a delusion. A scale was devised to detect the extent to which people use moral criteria in deciding on courses of action. This 'moralism' scale showed a reliability of .90. On a group of one hundred technical college students moralism was found to be high in two groups of respondents -- those who were radical on social issues and those who were conservative on issues of sexual morality. In the second study a polarised sample was obtained by student interviewers in a campus-wide study at the University of New South Wales. The issue was attitude to Apartheid. Anti-apartheid demonstrators were found to have lower moralism scores than the non-demonstrators but their moralism scores correlated highly with social desirability. A second study with Sociology I students confirmed this finding and also showed that demonstrators tended to reject intellectually the notion of an objective Right and Wrong. The high correlation with social desirability is interpreted to indicate however that the radical is strongly drawn to moralism even though he rejects it intellectually.


This paper is concerned with the ascription of 'right' and 'wrong' to certain actions. Considered by itself the proposition that there is a discoverable (or 'objective' or 'absolute'). Right and Wrong distinct from the imperatives of human legislation or policies could not be expected to receive wide support from social scientists (1). It is fairly clear that the difference between the two statements 'x is right' and 'x is pink' lies in the fact that the first tells us more about the utterer. It has the function of expressing personal values and preferences whereas the latter does not. This also holds for 'x is good' or 'x is something that ought to be done'.

We may on some occasions of course wish to translate 'x is good' as 'x is something that all men on all occasions would desire if they had full knowledge of its consequences for them' -- in which case it is an empirical statement normally requiring proof. On many occasions, however, it is accurately translatable only as 'I like x' or 'I have been taught to like x' or 'x will get me what I want'. The similarity in form between the two sentences 'x is good' and 'x is pink' does not on reflection deceive us into thinking that both are empirical propositions about something outside ourselves. In saying 'x is good' we tell something about ourselves (i.e. our policy beliefs or preferences) only.

Political polemics, however, often seem to involve some sort of reference to an absolute, true-for-all-times Right and Wrong. One does suspect that phrases such as 'basic human rights' are presented as describing something other than the personal preferences of the utterer or the legislative provisions of some community. In the absence of a provident Deity the source of these 'rights' is somewhat mystical and it comes as little surprise when users of such talk are referred to derogatorily as 'moralistic'. The political Left appears to attract this epithet while the Right is 'practical' or pragmatic. On the issue of support for white South Africa, Mr Gorton, a former Australian Prime Minister and head of the conservative Liberal-Country Party coalition, was reported as saying: 'Australia will decide its actions purely on the criterion of practical self-interest. It will not be swayed by moral considerations . . . . (2). Mr B. A. Santamaria, perhaps Australia's foremost Right-wing political commentator (and a devout Roman Catholic), was reported as saying: 'Australia should base its diplomacy on the principle of effective control, not of moral judgments (3). On the American political scene the liberal Mr Ramsey Clark, former Attorney-General was described as follows by the political journalist Sam Lipski: 'It is clear that what attracts many liberals to Mr Clark is his moralism, and that what angers his opponents is their inability to accept the Clark gospel' (4). Also in the U.S.A., the editor of "Ramparts", the sensationalist Left-wing magazine is reported as having said: 'We look at things from a moral point of view. That's what the new politics is all about' (5). Speaking of the British Conservative party Feiling (1953) says: 'Indeed, if we called them the most unprincipled of all parties, in the sense that rigidity or exclusive principle has been alien to their manner of thinking, there would be a measure of truth in it.' (p. 130). The study of moralism per se is obviously then an enterprise of the greatest social relevance. For all that, the following comment by Eisenman remains true: 'A wealth of research has been done on children's moral judgments, with comparatively little research on moral values in older subjects' (Eisenman, 1970; p. 34).

The work by Eisenman (1970) himself was like that by Jourard (1954), in that it appears to confound moral conservatism with moralism as such. One can believe that women have an inalienable right to have abortions on demand, but this is scarcely a morally conservative point of view. Moralism refers to the strength with which a belief about the rightness of some action is held. What that action is may be variable. It may be an action taken in accordance with a conservative policy or one taken in accordance with a liberal policy. Thus if a person said that on the whole he thought that women should remain virgins until they were married, he would appear as a conservative on a scale of moral conservatism. If, however, we discovered that he was mainly concerned about the risk of venereal disease, we might say that although he was conservative on that particular moral issue he was not very moralistic. If the basis for his attitude had been something like: 'It's just wrong and that's all there is to it' we would say that he was both morally conservative and moralistic. Thus moral conservatism-radicalism refers to the direction of the belief whereas moralism refers to the basis or justification for that belief. If a person is quite definite, however, that there is no such thing as right and wrong he cannot be either conservative or radical on moral issues. This is not to say that he may not have policy preferences. Thus he may say that he thinks the Vietnam war is a good thing but he may wish to support this statement only by saying that he (personally) hates 'all those little yellow bastards' and consequently is pleased by the thought of them wiping one-another out. He is not concerned to justify the slaughter as 'right' and condemnation of it as 'wrong', which he sees as simply irrelevant. On a conventional attitude scale of political conservatism such a person would show up as politically conservative while on an ideal scale of moralism he would be completely non-moralistic (a-moral ) . Another non-moralist, on the other hand might say that the Vietnam war was a bad thing because the thought of people being killed upsets him (personally). If he does call the war 'wrong' he is simply trying to persuade or induce others to experience the same response or take the same action that he does.

Perhaps the most widely known work on the measurement of moralism is that by Kohlberg (1969). His work has been also extended into the political field by Hampden-Turner & Whitten (1971). Kohlberg, however, makes the assumption that the stages of moral development he sees in (some) children can be equated with a scale of adult morality. Thus a person is 'more' moral if he exhibits decision-rationales similar to those children whom Kohlberg considers to be more morally developed. It will be evident that this is a rather arbitrary approach. Even if some children do go through these stages in a regular progression, this of itself is no criterion for saying that they are 'more' moral than when they started out. What would we say of a person who went through all Kohlberg's six stages and then went 'back' to Kohlberg's second stage? An answer to this question would surely reveal that the criterion for what is 'moral' exists only in Kohlberg's own set of values -- however plausible they may seem. Surely even if most people behaved as in the case given above, Kohlberg would still want to say that they were 'going back'. He would not want to regard the final stage as 'higher'. The 'scale' is thus imposed on the data rather than being derived from it. A less contentious scale of moralism would, therefore be highly desirable. Some sort of explicit and value-free measure of moralism is necessary. This is, of course, no easy task. It is easy enough to measure an attitude, but with moralism we want to measure something about how an attitude is held or justified. We want to measure a characteristic of attitudes. Even more difficult, we want a measure that will not be ideologically biased. As was pointed out, one can be moralistic about a wide variety of issues. If we want to examine whether Leftists are more or less moralistic, we cannot simply ascertain how many of a set of supposedly 'Left-wing moralistic' statements they agree with. They would obviously agree with them not only because they are moralistic but also because they are Left-wing. What we want to do is sort out the two possible bases for agreement. Only thus can we empirically examine whether moralism is characteristic of the Right, of the Left or of neither. Although the present author is something of a psychometric specialist with a long list of contributions to the measurement of psychological dispositions to his credit (Ray, 1970 a & b, 1971 a, b & c, 1972 a to g ), any idea at all for a solution to this problem eluded him for some years. As it is, what is presented in the following sections must be viewed as only a preliminary attempt at the objective measurement of moralism.

In the following study, then, a moralism scale is reported which is used to check on the hypothesised relationship between moralism and radical-humanitarian stances on social issues. An initial attempt will also be made to probe into 'what makes the moralist tick?'. Why do people seem to believe in an absolute Right and Wrong when there are such obvious questions than can be raised about the tenability of such beliefs?

STUDY I

Method

In the construction of the scale it was assumed that the important thing was not to ascertain whether, on mature reflection, the person believed that there was such a thing as absolute right and wrong, but rather to ascertain on what he based his decision when confronted with a demand for decision. The scale itself therefore was designed to take no sides in the philosophical debate over whether discoverable right and wrong exists. It merely considers responding in terms of what is believed to be right and responding in terms of one's own self-interest as possible alternative bases for decision. Presumably the person who had devoted some thought to the philosophical questions involved and concluded that there was no such thing as right and wrong would always use self-interest (enlightened?) as his decision basis. For him one of the alternatives would be excluded a priori. It is assumed however that for most people the choice between doing what is right and doing what is in one's own interest was a real one. Administration instructions for the scale included the assurance to the subjects that they could use 'their own definition' of what is right. Throughout, however, the interest was not in what it was that they thought to be right but rather in the relevance this had for their policy decisions. This is to some extent the opposite of the immediate concern in most attitude scales.

The scale took the form, then, of a set of situations or policy requirements wherein it was expected that people might divide in their responses. In response to each the subject was asked to tell whether he would 'Do what is right' (scored 3), 'Do what is to our own advantage' (scored 1) or 'Don't know' (scored 2). See the appendix for full details.

This scale is basically a measure of a person's set to respond 'Do what is right' in a variety of situations. What situations they are is relatively secondary -- as long as they are as near to 'real-life' as possible. It seems fairly clear, however, that there must be some temptation to social desirability responding also, and steps to control for this are indicated.

For the purpose of testing the scale, it was desired to employ a sample somewhat less demographically biased than the usual first-year university student sample. As has been shown many times elsewhere, (e.g. Ray, 1970a ) scales tested on university students often turn out to be far less satisfactory when applied to general community samples. This scale, therefore, was applied to a sample of one hundred evening students at North Sydney Technical College. It was administered as part of a larger questionnaire in normal class time by one of the teachers. Also included in the questionnaire were items to measure conservatism in social issues, political issues and issues of sexual morality (these scales are given in Ray (1971 c )). The short forms of Eysenck's Neuroticism and Extraversion scales were also included -- as were the eight strongest items (four negative and four positive) of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Greenwald & Satow, 1970); see the appendix.

Results

The reliability of the scale was .90 (Cronbach's, 1951, coefficient 'alpha'). This indicates a high degree of consistency in response on the part of these subjects. The fact that the item means oscillate on either side of the midpoint (2) indicates that a good spread of responses was obtained. Some subjects fairly consistently opted for what was 'right' while others fairly consistently opted for self-interest.

The correlations between all the variables measured in this study are given in Table 1. There are two groups of respondents who are high on moralism -- those who are radical on social issues and those who are conservative on issues of sexual morality (rs of -.239 and .377). These correlations remain significant when the social desirability artifact is removed by partial correlation. That political conservatism was not related to moralism reflects the many bases that political issues have. Moralism is obviously of very subsidiary importance in political life -- except on purely social issues. These correlations should be read in conjunction with the actual items of the three attitude scales. It is clear that in the political items (involving military preparedness and foreign policy) judgments of national vulnerability, likelihood of aggression and social class of respondent might be the important influences. Where humaneness of social practice on the home front is in question (e.g. racial prejudice, treatment of criminals etc.) moralism does play a part.

TABLE 1

Correlations of selected variables with moralism among 100 Technical College students

.....................Moralism....Pol. C...Soc. C...Mor. C....S. Des...Extr....Neur

Voting choice... .078...... .472.... .269...... .287....... .025... -.049... -.064
Moralism....................... -.155... -.239...... .377...... .403.... -.044... -.123
Political conservatism............... .504...... .171...... .042.... -.014... -.158
Social conservatism................................ .213..... -.217..... .056.... .059
Moral conservatism.............................................. -.045..... .065... -.092
Social desirability............................................................... -.042... -.303
Extraversion.................................................................................... .318



Discussion

An apparently satisfactory measuring instrument for moralism was produced. Instead of ranking people on an arbitrary value continuum of morality, it simply categorises people into whether or not they do accept a morality -- be it of whatever sort in their own personal life. This makes it possible for empirical investigations into the causes of moralistic attitudes to proceed. Given its importance to the great debates over social issues (also confirmed in this work) that feature so prominently in public life nowadays, an understanding of moralism could have a far-reaching impact. That it could be related to the justifications given for parental punishment during early childhood (as distinct to the type or intensity of that punishment) remains an open and interesting possibility. The initial checks made in this study show that moralism is not related to the broad personality categories of extraversion or neuroticism. The cognitive effects and correlates of moralistic training also still offer a promising field for investigation. As has been mentioned before (Maze, 1973), it could well be maintained that a belief in an absolute right and wrong is a type of delusion. It attributes to objects or actions a property for which there is no obvious manifestation or evidence. What needs does this mystical attribution subserve? Does it indicate a need to be protected from the imperatives of one's own impulses or is there a cognitive limitation or inadequacy of some kind? The aggressive violence of moralistic political movements (e.g. the anti-apartheid movement?) with their talk of 'conspiracy' and their blatant misrepresentations of their opponents in demoniacal terms 96), do in fact make an understanding of moralism an urgent necessity. (For a fuller disquisition on the Australian anti-apartheid movement see Ray 1971d.) The comment by the British Conservative Home Secretary (Mr Reginald Maudling) to the effect that 'there was an apparently growing doctrine that if one held views strongly enough, one was entitled to impose them on others by force (7) is also most relevant here.

STUDY II

The foregoing study fell into the well-known mould of correlating pencil-and-paper personality measures. This alone will obviously not suffice. We also want to know whether our new personality measure (the moralism scale) is related to actual behaviour of a politically radical kind. By reason of its topicality at the time of writing, the particular behaviour selected for examination centred around the anti-apartheid movement. It was desired to ascertain whether moralism was especially high among anti-apartheid demonstrators. If this could be shown to be so, it would provide some encouragement to the view that moralism is one of the causes of anti-apartheid demonstrating.

Method

It was proposed to obtain the mean scores of a group of people who had actually taken part in an anti-Apartheid demonstration and compare their scores on the Moralism scale with those previously obtained. This was not a particularly easy enterprise. The anti-Apartheid 'movement' as such is quite inchoate and there existed the real danger that contacts made purely through anti-Apartheid formal organisations might cover only 'organisation men' -- people who find an important part of their social rewards by joining any radical movement that happens to be going. It was desirable, therefore, to cast our net widely enough to catch 'supporters' as well -- people who demonstrate out of concern for the cause who may not necessarily be habitually alienated. Two separate solutions to this sampling problem seemed possible and both were adopted. One solution was to administer a questionnaire to all students in the Introduction to Sociology course at the University of N.S.W. It was felt on a priori grounds that a substantial proportion of Sociology students might at some time have taken part in one of the demonstrations and a question was included in the schedule to check on this. Students who had demonstrated could then be separated out and compared with those who had not. The other solution, and the one that will be reported initially here, was to send interviewers out on the campus to ask people whether or not they had ever demonstrated and, if they had, ask them to fill out a questionnaire. In this sample two students were used as interviewers. They contacted people they knew personally and also approached people in places such as the cafeteria. The questionnaires used in the campus-wide study contained the moralism and social desirability scales as before, but the accompanying scales were different. There was an Attitude to Apartheid scale plus the Ray (1971c) Attitude to Authority scale and an Alienation scale.

These scales deserve description in some detail. The attitude to Apartheid scale is given in the appendix. It is a balanced ten item scale designed to reflect condemnation versus acceptance of Apartheid. It is scored so that a high score denotes approval of Apartheid. With this scale it was hoped to provide an attitudinal counterpart to the behavioural dichotomy. The Attitude to Authority (AA) scale has, of course, been fully described elsewhere. Suffice it so say here that the AA scale is designed to provide a less inferential and more predictively valid measure of authoritarianism than does the California F scale (Adorno et al, 1950). It has been found to predict submissive, but not domineering or aggressive behaviour (See Ray, 1971c ). The Alienation scale was that given in the previous chapter.

Results

In gathering this sample, the interviewers endeavoured to obtain a highly polarised group. That is, a particular effort was made to obtain people who were opposed to demonstrating as well as those who actively supported the cause. In contrast to the other sample of students to be reported, then, the non-demonstrators here are also to some extent anti-demonstrators. There were twenty-four demonstrators and twenty-seven non-demonstrators in the sample. A 'demonstrator' was defined as someone who answered 'Yes' to the question: 'Have you ever taken part in an anti-Apartheid demonstration?' appearing at the end of the questionnaire. All respondents answered yes or no.

Pooling responses for both types of respondent produced results some of which were quite similar to those obtained in Study I. The correlation between moralism and social desirability was .402 (cf. .403). The correlation between moralism scores and scores on the attitude to apartheid scale was -.368 (cf. -.239 with the social conservatism scale in Study I) . Note that both attitude scales are scored so that a radical would get a low score. The correlation of -.368 is significant at the .01 level. Moralists were not more authoritarian (r = -.185) but were less alienated (r = -.277). Since normlessness has always figured as an element in the concept of alienation, this later result may be taken as concurrent validation for the moralism scale. Moralism and normlessness are obviously opposed.

It is when we come to the correlations with behaviour that the results partake of the unexpected. The correlations between having demonstrated and moralism is non-significant and is in fact in the direction opposite to that expected. With 'Yes' in answer to the 'Have you demonstrated' question scored '2' and 'No' scored '1', the r with moralism scores was -.133. To have attitudes and behaviour unrelated is conceptual problem enough, but to have them running in opposite directions is very peculiar indeed.

To help sort out this peculiarity, the data was divided into the two sets of demonstrators and non-demonstrators and re-analysed. The mean scores on the moralism scale (SDs given in brackets) for the two groups was 78.41 (10.11) for the demonstrators and 81.18 (10.48) for the non-demonstrators. Both these levels are high in relation to what was observed with the sample of Study I -- where the mean was 70.64 , (13.49). This does of course tend to suggest a U-curve relationship -- with both people who are strongly 'for' and people who are strongly 'against' being especially moralistic.

A much more revealing comparison uncovered by the re-analysis, however, was in the correlation between moralism and social desirability compared across the two groups. For the anti-demonstrators it was .193 while for the demonstrators it was .601. Note that this cannot be explained in terms of a high level of social desirability (invalid) responding on the part of the demonstrators. Their overall mean on the SD scale was in fact -- at 24.75 (6.18) lower than that of the non-demonstrators -- at 28.88 (5.32). This compares with figures of 23.11 (4.87) for the sample of Study I. A summary table of the correlation observed in this study is given below as Table 2.

TABLE 2

Moralism among two groups of students

A. Correlations among 24 demonstrators

................................Auth...........Ali.......Att. Apar.....Soc. Desirability

Moralism................ -.347......... -.570.... -.655.............. .601
Authoritarianism..................... -.172..... .286.............. -.306
Alienation............................................. .431.............. -.358
Attitude to Apartheid................................................... -.656


B. Correlations among 27 non-demonstrators

...............................Auth............Ali.......Att. Apar.....Soc. Desirability

Moralism............... -.169.......... .063.... -.219.............. -.193
Authoritarianism..................... -.223.... .576................ .078
Alienation........................................... -.227............... -.476
Attitude to Apartheid................................................... -.295


Discussion

The evidence just reported suggests that moralism brings about anti-Apartheid attitudes, but not anti-Apartheid demonstrating. The high correlation between the moralism scale and social desirability among the demonstrators, however, does suggest that their responses to the moralism scale cannot be taken at face-value. Among the demonstrators, moralism is associated with 'faking good. Our suggested explanation for the findings will therefore be centred around this phenomenon.

The most charitable view we can take of social desirability responding is that it indicates confusion. As Martin (1964b) suggests, responses in terms of a social desirability set are a recourse where there is some difficulty in responding in terms of content. What might be the source of this confusion? It could be that moralism is in some sense old-fashioned, reactionary or traditional and that, increasingly, the norm among educated people is to reject it. Notions that value judgments are in some sense non-objective do in fact seem to permeate modern social discourse. Among educated people, the saying that 'There is no such thing as Right and Wrong' is almost conventional wisdom. It makes sense then that no-one should so thoroughly accept this view as the radical activist. If nothing else, it does have the value of freeing him from so much that has gone before. Against this, however, we must set the strong appeal we have noted before that moral imperatives do appear to have for at least the radical propagandist. There is to the radical some attraction for appeals to absolute and inalienable Right or Rights.

We could, of course, understand this conflict as only apparent and really rather Machiavellian. We could say that although the radical does not believe in morality himself, he does find it effective in motivating those others to whom he must appeal or whom he must try to convert.

I cannot admit this Machiavellian answer because it is too implausible. I am in a word, prepared to allow the possibility of sincere and honest radicalism. It is suggested that the real answer lies again in the by now familiar phenomenon of attitude-behaviour discrepancy (Ray, 1971d ). If one may for a moment wax anecdotal, on occasions I have, when talking with young Maoists and others of the more 'revolutionary' (and minuscule) Left in Australia, often had the experience of hearing their actions and creed justified by talk that boiled down to something being 'just wrong' or 'basically unjust' (cf. Bedford, 1970). When giving my reply to this: 'But I don't believe that there's any such thing as Right and Wrong', the typical answer was initially a rather long silence followed by: 'But I don't either'. This would then be followed by some sort of attempt by other arguments to persuade me to feel as the revolutionary did about the fancied 'injustice'. The conversation always terminated in the revolutionary realising that he was speaking to someone who just did not get angry about the same things he did. This caused complete (if sometimes polite) cessation of further interaction. The radical, then, although he would on serious reflection reject out of hand the notion of an objective Right, does find in the heat of debate no language more appropriate to express his feelings than the language of Right and Wrong. Once out of his armchair, the radical is as moralistic (if not more so) as the reactionary. His abstract conclusions about the nature of Right have not penetrated far or deeply into his everyday behaviour or thinking. Underneath it all, he is still working with the same sort of assumptions as the reactionary. The point at issue is always what is right, not whether anything is right. If then to some the radical appears an especially moralistic person, this is to be understood as showing that he is a person who feels especially deeply about certain social phenomena and, as a consequence, he has more need of the language that is traditionally appropriate to expressing such feeling and which has most efficacy in inspiring others to feel similarly. The danger of course is that if the radical talks as if there were an absolute Right and Wrong he might, given the opportunity, act as if there were also. We all know the pitiless oppression that can result (e.g. the Spanish inquisition, Stalinist Russia) when men believe that they act in the name of Right. Thus alone can inhumane acts be justified in the name of humanity and mercy.

The challenge, then, is to understand why opposing affect can be attached to the same phenomenon or policy among different people. Given the need to defend that affect, and where an appeal to self-interest is not immediately plausible, people at either end of the political spectrum will probably defend it (at least initially) in moralistic language. If we are to take note of the political quotations given earlier at all we might in fact entertain a revised hypothesis, not that radicals are more moralistic, but rather that they more often express affect for policies or actions that can not readily be justified by observable or inferable self-interest. They might be, in a word, more altruisic (to put a 'good' face on it) or more irrational (to put a 'bad' face on it). For whatever reason they may more often have a practical need to give a moral apologia for their policies and preferences.

A step towards the explanation of this opposition of affect-attachment between conservatives and radicals is to be found in Ray, 1972d. It is there suggested that childhood experience of inter-personal aggression may carry over to assumptions in adult life about the greater or lesser probability of international aggression.

Looking at it from the radical's point of view, one crucial problem is to understand why it is that some people may actually like war and enjoy aggression. The facile answer that such people are 'sick' is at best false (Elms, 1970; Masling, 1954; Martin & Ray, 1972; Ray, 1971c; Ray, 1972c and e) and at worst the sort of terrifying value-judgment that put Zhores Medvedev and other Soviet intellectuals who criticise the regime in psychiatric hospitals for indefinite periods and against all medical evidence. Until we have understood why some people like aggression (and indeed perhaps after we have come to understand it) we can be sure that there will be many more Vietnams.

The above interpretation of the findings of Study II, although plausible, does stand in need of further confirmation. This is especially so because informal interviews with some of the respondents revealed that at least some of the people who reject the idea of a discoverable morality but who nonetheless order their lives according to what they believe to be 'right' were not really being inconsistent. Some respondents appeared to be using the terms 'good' and 'right' simply to index the accepted practices or preferences of their own community or reference group. In this sense an argument about the 'goodness' of some practice could intelligibly proceed as an argument about what is or is not compatible with the other standards or preferences of the group. This is perhaps particularly likely where it is felt that the particular preference or standard is one that would be required to ensure the enjoyment by the individual of certain universally sought biological states (such as shelter and nourishment). It might be argued that humanitarianism is 'right' in this sense. It is a value which, if held, gives me the best assurance of the good (pleasant) life. This is, of course, an empirical proposition and can be argued as such without any commitment to belief in a discoverable morality. This, then, was taken into account in designing Study III.

STUDY III

It had been hoped that both the content and format of the moralism scale would have precluded the type of responding described above-where the 'do what is right' alternative is seen as being to some extent equivalent to 'do what is to your own advantage'. Since it appeared that this might not have happened as planned in some instances, a further scale of the classical 'attitude to -' type seemed called for -- in this case 'attitude to morality'. This scale would take as its focus the issue that the moralism scale had eschewed -- i.e. whether there is or not an objective Right and Wrong. The items of the scale constructed to fill this need are given in the appendix.

As was foreshadowed above, the sample used in this study was obtained by administering a questionnaire to the Introduction to Sociology class at the University of NSW. Aside from the moralism and attitude to morality scales, the questionnaire also contained the attitude to Apartheid and social desirability scales as before. The scales occurred in the questionnaire in the order in which they were given above -- i.e. with moralism coming first. Analysable results were obtained from 117 respondents.

Reliabilities (Cronbach's, 1951, coefficient 'alpha') observed for the scales were as follows: Moralism .9I; Attitude to Morality .76; Attitude to Apartheid .73; and Social Desirability .69.

As was to be expected from the results of both previous studies, there was a significant negative relationship between the Moralism and Attitude to Apartheid scales (r = -.200) when the sample was analysed as a whole. The overall correlation between moralism and social desirability was also maintained -- with an r of .203.

As in the second study above, the correlation between moralism and having actually demonstrated was again non-significant but negative in sign (r = -.088). When the subjects were divided into the two groups of thirty demonstrators and eighty-seven non-demonstrators, the means of the non-demonstrators were again slightly (but non-significantly) higher on the moralism scale -- 75.19 (12.03) versus 72.76 (15.40). The scores on the Social Desirability scale were 24.87 (4.83) for the non-demonstrators and 23.86 (5.40) for the demonstrators.

The matter of particularly great interest in this study, however, is the comparison between the two groups with the attitude to morality scale. The mean for the demonstrators was 54.26 (12.58) and for the non-demonstrators it was 60.79 (8.97). The 't' between these two means is significant <.05. The correlation between the moralism and social desirability scales was .074 for the non-demonstrators and .453 for the demonstrators. The correlation between the attitude to morality and social desirability scales was -.082 for the demonstrators and .062 for the non-demonstrators -- both of which are non-significant.

Our suggestion that the much higher correlation between the moralism and social desirability scales among the demonstrators could be due to their overt rejection of morality has thus received support. The theoretical mid-point (no. of items x mid-point of each item) of the attitude to morality scale is 60. We can see therefore that the non-demonstrators vacillate on whether there is an objective morality whereas the demonstrators definitely reject it.

Both the findings and the inferences drawn from the previous study have then been supported by this third study.

The overall correlations observed in Study III are given in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Correlations with moralism among 117 first-year students

A. Demonstrators (n = 30)

.........................................Att. Mor......Att. Ap.......Soc. Desirability

Moralism........................... .211............. -.394.......... .453
Attitude to Morality................................ .081.......... -.062
Attitude to Apartheid............................................... -.272


B. Non-Demonstrators (n = 87)

........................................Att. Mor.......Att. Ap........Soc. Desirability

Moralism............................ .340............ -.155........... -.074
Attitude to Morality............................... -.061............. .062
Attitude to Apartheid................................................. -.108


Discussion

We must conclude that, contrary to what one would suppose from everyday observation, the radical activist is not (at least overtly) a moralist and is in fact a person who is characterised by the clear rejection of an absolute morality. He is, however, caught in the ambivalence of seeing morality as highly desirable. Among radicals, people who are trying to 'fake good' choose the 'Do what is right' alternative of the moralism scale rather than the 'Do what is to your own advantage' alternative. Among non-activists and non-radicals doing what is right is not seen as deserving more esteem than doing what is to one's own advantage.

We can thus see the radical activist as a conflicted person who has particular need of just that which he also sees he must reject. In terms of the explanation for moralism given in Maze (1973), we can only suppose that the radical activist is one who has received all the characteristic totalitarian upbringing of the moralist but who for some reason has rejected moral absolutism at the conscious level only. What his attitude to morality scores would disguise, the correlation between his moralism and social desirability scores strongly reveals. Everyday observation then is not so wrong after all. Both attitudinal and behavioural radicalism does go with moralism -- the only qualification necessary is that behavioural radicalism goes with what is potentially a most pernicious form of moralism -- unacknowledged moralism.

It is perhaps in order here to look at the possible reasons both for the radical's overt rejection of morality and his real attraction to it. We could say, as was suggested earlier, that the radical simply feels outrage at the discomfiture of others (and of himself) much more readily. This need not necessarily be traced back to the fact that he was brought up to respond in that way, though there are now plenty of studies (e.g. Keniston, 1968) which confirm that young radical leaders at least are simply putting into practice values they learnt from their parents. They are not in fact characteristically alienated from the culture of their homes. It could also be possible that some sort of biological predisposition to sensitivity or emotionality (Eysenck, 1967) has a role in making some people more radical than their home-background would demand. In either case this outrage is presumably greater than what other people in general feel. In this situation the idea that the radical has identified some property ( 'wrongness' ) of the outrageous situation which other people have not as yet identified at once furnishes the radical with cause for self-congratulation, explanation for his own oddity, and material for propaganda. We can thus see that there are strong incentives for moralism to be perpetuated and transmitted in radical families. In any one instance we could not be sure then to what extent moralism was a cause or an effect of radicalism. Certainly the radical brought up in a radical family would have a remarkably good chance of learning both the outrage and its apologia. No reasonable person could of course object to others feeling outrage of this nature. It is in the apologia that danger might lurk.

Having seen then that moralism for the radical is probably both a response enforced in childhood and a response of great immediate value, we need to consider why it is in general not acknowledged when under challenge. Again as was suggested above, the answer probably lies in greater acceptance by the radical of the conclusions of an intellectual sub-culture. The prominence and extremeness of students in radical movements is probably the best-known evidence of this. This could also have a bearing on why radicals feel greater outrage about social phenomena. Through being better informed, the stimuli to outrage are probably more available to them. Given the exposure to disturbing information and ideas that students have, people in the general population might also be as radical as students; greater outrage might in some cases be simply the product of greater or more vivid information. Beyond sub-cultural influences, however, the denial of morality would also have value to the radical in enabling him to discard the system which has produced the phenomena disturbing to him. If the man who supports 'the system' argues that: 'We think this is right because . . .' it is indeed a neat and intellectually respectable ploy to say: 'But nothing is right'. This would certainly confound most opponents rather readily. The radical has then detected that the untenability of moralistic assumptions invalidates many of the assumptions upon which existing society is built. As one who would tear down what exists, this suits him very well indeed. The sorrow is that he has not realised that the moralism is probably at least as harmful as the assumptions it has been used to justify. On this account what we want are more radical radicals. A society where grandiose justifications of one's own personal affect were recognised as not possible would surely be a more tolerant one. 'All men are equal!' are surely fighting words in a way that 'I like to treat all men equally' or 'it would be in our own interest to treat all men equally' surely are not. The moralist can condemn. The non-moralist must try to understand.

NOTES

1. Among philosophers, hostility to such a view extends at least as far back as Friedrich Nietzsche: e.g. Beyond Good and Evil (1907), London: Foulis.

2. Report in the "Australian" newspaper, 23 January 1971. (p. 11)

3. Report in the "Sydney Morning Herald" newspaper, 10 February 1971. (p. 11)

4. Report in the "Australian" newspaper, 21 November 1970. (P. 11B)

5. Report in "Time" magazine, 6 January 1967. (p. 39 )

6. A recent anti-apartheid poster to be seen on the campuses of all three Sydney universities was headed: 'Australia-South Africa -- the white conspiracy. Bishop Crowther speaks'. Paranoia is not exclusive to the political Right.

7. Report in the "Australian" newspaper, 16 January 1971. (p. 10 )


REFERENCES

Bedford, I. White Australia: The fear of others. Politics, 1975, 5, 224-227.

Cronbach, L.J.(1964) Essentials of psychological testing N.Y.: Harper.

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Eysenck, H.J. (1967) The biological basis of personality Springfield Ill.: Thomas

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APPENDIX

The Moralism scale

Following are a list of things that people sometimes have to decide whether to do or not. We would like you to read each question and tell us in each case what you would go by if the decision were up to you. Tell us in each case whether you would choose what was right or whether you would choose what was to your own best advantage. These questions are all ones where many people think we should just do what is to our own advantage, so please do not feel afraid to say so if that is what you think. You circle one of the three numbers to indicate your answer.


1 Should we steal things from big business firms? (Presuming you're not likely to get caught)
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


2 Should we steal things from persons we know? (presuming we're not likely to get caught)
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


3 Should we give back money we see someone drop in the street? (Presuming there was nobody else around to see whether we did or not)
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


4 Should we allow African negroes to migrate to Australia if they want to?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


5 Should we allow Chinese people to migrate to Australia if they want to?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


6 Should we torture prisoners of war to get information out of them?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


7 Should we tell white lies?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


8 Should we tell serious lies?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


9 Should men force a girl to have sex with them if she didn't want to?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


10 Should we kill someone we hate if we were pretty sure we could get away with it?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


11 Should we bash up someone who we really dislike?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


12 Should Australia send its troops to fight in Vietnam?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


13 Should the Australian Government co-operate with the South African Government in business and defence even though the South Africans are hard on the black people?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


14 Should girls remain virgins until they are married?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


15 Should we do things that might harm other people?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


16 Should you help a small-time criminal in any way?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


17 Should we eat, drink and be merry while people in other countries are starving?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


18 Should we eat, drink and be merry while people next door are starving?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


19 Should we tell lies to escape paying some of our taxes?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


20 Should we break the speed limit when we are driving?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


21 Should we say insulting things about other people behind their back?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


22 Should we say insulting things about other people to their face?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


23 Should we dob in our mates to the boss if they have done something wrong?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


24 Should we crawl to the boss?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


25 Should we bung on an act to get out of doing something we don't like?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


26 If someone we know is in trouble with the police, should we help him to avoid them?
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


27 You are a used-car salesman. You have an old car to sell which you know will break down completely not long after it is sold. A customer from interstate, who doesn't know much about cars, offers you $500 for it and says he hopes to drive it back to his home state. Would you:
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


28 You are the honorary treasurer of a social club. You know you can take some of the club's money for your own use without anybody ever finding out. Would you:
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


29 You are a prosperous shopkeeper. You get some goods in at a very low cost to you. You are deciding whether to pass on the low cost to your customers or not. Your customers need the goods but cannot get them from anyone but you. Would you:
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


30 You are a big businessman. You have a small competitor. You know you can ruin your competitor by cutting prices temporarily. Would you:
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know


31 You are a trade union boss. Some of your unionists want to force non-union members to join the union by threats of bashing, but they won't do it unless they get the go-ahead from you. Would you:
3 Do what is right
1 Do what is to our own advantage
2 Don't know



Notes:
(1) Items 23, 24 and 25 above use peculiarly Australian idiom and might have to be omitted if administered to other populations.
(2) The scale score is the sum of the numbers circled.


The Attitude to Morality Scale

Items marked 'R' are reverse-scored.

Following is a set of statements on which we would like to get your opinion. You will find them a bit repetitious but this is because this questionnaire is only a trial version. On the basis of your response we expect to be able to cut out more than half of the statements in later versions of the survey. You indicate whether you personally agree or disagree with each statement by circling a number. Try to answer each question in its own right without looking back to see how you responded before. Answers are given by circling one of the numbers from 5 to 1 to signify Strongly Agree, Agree, Not Sure, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.


1 There is no such thing as an absolute right and wrong. R
2 The only things that are right and wrong are what man has made so by his laws. R
3 Things are only wrong if you think they are. R
4 There are some things which can never possibly be right.
5 It is always possible that what is right to one man will be wrong to another. R
6 What is right and wrong was laid down before man ever began to think about it.
7 Right and wrong is a myth. R
8 What is right and wrong doesn't depend on men's opinions about it.
9 There is a higher moral law of which man's law is only an imperfect reflection.
10 There are some things which are right regardless of time and place
11 One man's opinion on what is right and wrong is as good as another's. R
12 There are universal moral laws.
13 What is right for one man may be wrong for another. R
14 Some things are just wrong and that's all there is to it.
15 Whether a thing is right or not doesn't depend on man's convenience.
16 There are no absolute, unchanging moral laws that man can go by R
17 Things are regarded as wrong only because if everyone did them, civilized life would become impossible. R
18 Your conscience is nearly always an infallible guide.
19 Some things you just know to be wrong without anybody needing to tell you.
20 You cannot go against your conscience.


The Attitude to Apartheid Scale

Items marked 'R' are reverse-scored.

1 The South African government should definitely abolish its Apartheid policy as soon as possible. R
2 Apartheid may not do as much harm as some people think
3 The South African blacks are every bit as good as the whites and should not be discriminated against. R
4 Some separation of different races is a good thing if conflicts are to be avoided.
5 The South Africans are ruled by a brutal Fascist Government. R
6 People here in Australia should do everything they can to smash apartheid. R
7 If the blacks in South Africa were really being oppressed as much as some people make out, they could always leave the place or use force to get a better deal from the white minority.
8. It is survival of the fittest in this world so if the South African blacks can't help themselves they don't deserve to be helped.
9 It is no good us condemning the South African whites because we in Australia would probably do the same if we were outnumbered four to one by a less civilised race.
10 The South African attitude towards their blacks is a disgrace to humanity. R


The Social Desirability Scale

Items marked 'R' are reverse-scored.

Here are a few questions about how you see yourself. Answer 5, 4. 3, 2, or 1 to indicate from "Definitely Yes" to "Definitely No"

1 R I have sometimes taken unfair advantage of another person.
2 I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake.
3 R There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
4 R I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
5 I am always courteous; even to people who are disagreeable.
6 R I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my own way.
7 No matter who I'm talking to; I'm always a good listener.
8 I am quick to admit making a mistake.




Click here for a list of all John Ray's comments on moral philosophy